Timon, to begin with: what do we mean by knowledge security?

At its core, it's about preventing knowledge developed in the Netherlands from ultimately harming our security.

This can happen in various ways that need to be prevented with proper knowledge security policies. One example is unwanted knowledge transfer. Just as an innovative company protects its patents, the scientific community ensures that its most sensitive knowledge does not inadvertently fall into the wrong hands or get misused by other countries for military purposes. Another aspect is covert influence. This involves state actors influencing and pressuring scientists in the Netherlands, preventing them from freely conducting their research.

If the Dutch scientific community is too naive about this, there is a risk that people elsewhere in the world may be oppressed or harmed with knowledge developed in the Netherlands. For example, facial recognition software developed to track criminals being used elsewhere to track dissidents of a foreign regime, thereby suppressing democracy.

Knowledge security seems to have quickly risen on the agenda in recent years. Where does this come from?

This is all related to the world around us. Due to increased geopolitical tensions, the perception of science has changed. Governments and institutions now see that knowledge and technology (such as AI, chips, or biotech) are also strategic tools. The big question is: how do you remain an open, international knowledge country without being naive about the risks? This urgency is now felt everywhere.

How do you view this?

I mainly see how fast things have progressed. Where knowledge security was initially something new or even abstract for many institutions, almost all institutions now have their affairs in order with their own policies and processes. There are institutions without policies, but they have deliberately chosen not to have policies because, for example, they hardly collaborate internationally.

This has clearly had an effect: institutions now recognize risks better and are better able to limit them themselves. In that sense, knowledge security has matured rapidly. A few years ago, institutions and scientists viewed knowledge security as a threat to open science. Now we see a shift: knowledge security is increasingly seen as a requirement to protect open science. That is quite a significant change.

How has government policy helped with this?

In the initial phase, the role of the government was crucial. There was a conscious choice for a model focusing on awareness and the self-responsibility of institutions. The Knowledge Security Desk has worked well in this regard: by providing information, answering questions, and bringing institutions together in a learning community, knowledge security has not only become more widely known but also deepened in the sector.

At the same time, we see that this success in 2026 has led to a new situation: institutions have become more mature themselves and now have different support needs.

What are the changing needs in this regard?

Institutions are less in need of general information and more in need of specialized expertise that they do not possess. Institutions are looking for a sparring partner, for example, to help determine if a technology falls under complex legislation or to identify risks within a specific collaboration.

The Knowledge Security Desk could be this sparring partner, but it would require more resources, knowledge, and mandate than it currently has.

What are the main practical challenges institutions are facing right now?

I see three recurring dilemmas:

• Open or closed? The balance between open science and protection of sensitive research. The motto "open where possible, closed when necessary" is still relevant but sometimes difficult to determine in practice.
• Customized or fixed rules? The search for an optimum between a time-consuming case-by-case risk assessment with the chance of arbitrariness and an efficient guideline that may be too broad.
• Preventing exclusion. Preventing discrimination and stigmatization. Knowledge security is about risks in a collaboration, not about where someone comes from, but the focus understandably lies on a few countries at high risk. This could lead to stigmatization of people from those countries.

What does this mean for the coming years?

We are clearly in a new phase. The initial years were about foundation-building: raising awareness and establishing policies. That phase is largely completed. The next step requires more targeted support tailored to different types of risks and institutions. The core remains the same: knowledge security is not about choosing between openness and security but about carefully combining both.