Timon, to start with: what do we mean by knowledge security?

At its core, it's about preventing knowledge developed in the Netherlands from ultimately compromising our security.

This can happen in various ways, which should be prevented with good knowledge security policy. One way is through unwanted knowledge transfer. Similar to how an innovative company protects its patents, the scientific community ensures that its most sensitive knowledge does not fall into the wrong hands or get misused by other countries, for example, for military purposes. Another way is covert influence. This involves state actors influencing and pressuring scientists in the Netherlands, preventing them from freely conducting their research.

If the Dutch scientific community is too naïve about this, there is a risk that people elsewhere in the world might be oppressed or harmed with knowledge developed in the Netherlands. For example, facial recognition software developed to track criminals being used elsewhere to track dissidents of a foreign regime, thus suppressing democracy.

Knowledge security seems to have quickly risen to the agenda in recent years. What is driving this?

This shift is closely tied to the world around us. Due to increased geopolitical tensions, the perception of science has changed. Governments and institutions now see that knowledge and technology (such as AI, chips, or biotech) are also strategic tools. The big question is: how do you remain an open, international knowledge country without being naïve about the risks? This sense of urgency is now widespread.

How do you view this?

I mainly see how quickly things have progressed. Whereas knowledge security was once something new or even abstract for many institutions, most now have their affairs in order with their policies and processes. There are some institutions without policies, but they have deliberately chosen not to have them because, for instance, they hardly collaborate internationally.

This has clearly had an impact: institutions are better at recognising risks and are more capable of limiting them themselves. In that sense, in a short period, knowledge security has matured. A few years back, institutions and scientists viewed knowledge security as a threat to open science. Now we are seeing a shift: knowledge security is increasingly being seen as a requirement to protect open science. That is quite a significant change.

How has government policy helped with this?

In the initial phase, the role of the government was crucial. A model focusing on raising awareness and the self-responsibility of institutions was deliberately chosen. The Knowledge Security Desk has worked well in this regard: by providing information, answering questions, and bringing institutions together in a learning community, knowledge security has not only become more widely known but also deepened in the sector.

At the same time, we see that this success by 2026 has resulted in a new situation: institutions have become more mature and now have different needs for support.

What are the changing needs?

Institutions are looking less for general information and more for specialised expertise they do not possess. They seek a sparring partner who can, for instance, help them determine whether a technology falls under complex legislation or assess risks within a specific collaboration.

The Knowledge Security Desk could serve as this sparring partner, but it would require more resources, knowledge, and authority than it currently has.

What are the main challenges institutions are facing in practice?

I see three recurring dilemmas:

• Open or closed? Striking a balance between open science and safeguarding sensitive research. The motto "open where possible, closed when necessary" is still relevant, but can be challenging to determine in practice.
• Customised or fixed rules? Finding the optimum balance between a time-consuming case-by-case risk assessment with the potential of arbitrariness and an efficient guideline that may be too broad.
• Avoiding exclusion. Preventing discrimination and stigmatisation. Knowledge security concerns risks in collaboration, not where someone comes from, but the focus naturally tends to be on a few high-risk countries. This can lead to stigmatisation of individuals from those countries.

What does this mean for the coming years?

We are clearly in a new phase. The initial years focused on building awareness and establishing policies. That phase is largely completed. The next step requires more targeted support tailored to different types of risks and institutions. The core remains unchanged: knowledge security is not about choosing between openness and safety, but about carefully combining both.